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Background: In order to ensure their population’s regular access to essential medicines, many least developed
countries and developing countries are faced with the policy question of whether to import or manufacture drugs
locally, in particular for life-saving antiretroviral medicines for HIV/AIDS patients. In order for domestic
manufacturing to be viable and cost-effective, the local industry must be able to compete with international
suppliers of medicines by producing sufficiently low cost ARVs.
Methods: This paper considers the ‘make-or-buy’ dilemma by using Tanzania as a case study. Key informant
interviews, event-driven observation, and purposive sampling of documents were used to evaluate the case study.
The case study focused on Tanzania’s imitation technology transfer agreement to locally manufacture a first-line
ARV (3TC + d4T +NVP), reverse engineering the ARV.
Results: Tanzania is limited by weak political support for the use of TRIPS flexibilities, limited production capacity
for ARVs and limited competitiveness in both domestic and regional markets. The Ministry of Health and Social
Welfare encourages the use of flexibilities while others push for increased IP protection. Insufficient production
capacity and lack of access to donor-financed tenders make it difficult to obtain economies of scale and provide
competitive prices.
Conclusions: Within the “make-or-buy” context, it was determined that there are significant limitations in domestic
manufacturing for developing countries. The case study highlights the difficulty of governments to make use of
economies of scale and produce low-cost medicines, attract technology transfer, and utilize the flexibilities of the
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The results demonstrate the
importance of evaluating barriers to the use of TRIPS flexibilities and long-term planning across sectors in future
technology transfer and manufacturing initiatives.Introduction
Global efforts to lower ARV prices and scale-up treat-
ment access in Sub-Saharan Africa have fortunately
resulted in price decreases from approximately US
$10,000 per person per year (pppy) in 2000 to less than
US$100 in 2007 [1]. Although treatment cost is not the
only factor affecting access to medicines, it is obviously
important. Access to ARV therapy in Tanzania has been
steadily rising since 2004, with a coverage rate of 32% by
2010 guidelines (49% by 2009 guidelines) [2]. Still, the
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orTreatment rates throughout Sub-Saharan Africa are
still inadequate and, in 2007, 72% of HIV-infected indivi-
duals in need of treatment still remained without access
to ARVs [3]. Considered alongside other notable barriers
to treatment access, such as insufficient health care
provision, poor political commitment, poverty, tariffs
and taxes on imported medicines, drug access remains
complex [4]. One major concern related to ARV access
in developing countries is the World Trade Organiza-
tion’s (WTO) Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property (herein referred to as TRIPS)
and the impact its patent terms have on ARV prices.
TRIPS came into effect in 1995 as a multilateral treaty
that, for the first time, linked international trade
liberalization with the protection of intellectual property
(IP) including trademarks, copyrights, and patents.Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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enforcement of both pharmaceutical product and
process patents, and therefore market exclusivity, for
20 years after their filing date (generally around the time
of discovery). Harmonization sets a universal standard
for patenting; if countries do not enforce agreed inter-
national standards, they are potentially subject to sanc-
tions imposed by the WTO.
One strategy that developing countries are encouraged
to use for price reduction is the domestic manufacture
of drugs. The logic for this strategy stems from depend-
ency theory and import substitution. The focus shifted
to regulation and effective distribution after the develop-
ment of the WHO Essential Medicines Programme in
1975, but the possible role of domestic manufacturing
was revisited with the onset of the TRIPS Agreement
and the subsequent public health focus in the Doha Dec-
laration in 2001.
Article 7 addresses the transfer of technology and de-
velopment of technological capabilities that should result
from IP protection. It requires, “the promotion of
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissem-
ination of technology” [5]. Article 66.2 in particular
encouraged developed countries to provide industry
incentives for pharmaceutical technology transfer and
capacity building in developing countries [5]. Provisions
outlined in the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declar-
ation of 2001 prioritize public health over trade and
allow developing countries to manufacture patented
medicines in cases of national emergency. The Doha
Declaration clarified the criteria of national emergency
to clearly include public health crises [6]. The August
2003 Decision then provided a mechanism by which
countries without manufacturing capacity could utilize
the compulsory licensing flexibility in light of the TRIPS
requirement that it be used for domestic market only
[7]. This provision allowed countries with manufacturing
capacity to file for a compulsory license for the purpose
of export – however this flexibility has only been used
once since its implementation.
Patent protection under the TRIPS Agreement
imposes limits on when and how local production can
take place. Nevertheless, some developing countries that
are obliged to implement TRIPS by 2005 have managed
to navigate its restrictions at times to produce drugs lo-
cally. Strategies have included manufacturing drugs
through voluntary licenses with pharmaceutical compan-
ies and compulsory licenses for patented products. Some
examples of compulsory licensing are Zimbabwe in 2002
for a selection of ARVs (including stavudine, nevirapine,
and zidovudine), Brazil in 2007 for efavirenz, Ecuador in
2010 for ritonavir [8] [9] [10]. The Doha Declaration
extended the transition period for LDCs to 2016 result-
ing in less restricted access to generic versions of drugs.Recently, there has been discussion of extending this
transition period further, a move supported by the Inter-
national Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers &
Associations [9]. But as this case study will show, bar-
riers remain to improving access through technology
transfer in these countries.
Least developing and developing countries need to
consider whether it is in their best interest to produce
drugs domestically or import them from existing generic
producers, such as those in India. The make or buy di-
lemma weighs which strategy would be most cost effect-
ive considering the low prices that must be matched by
domestic manufacturers. There is compelling evidence
on both sides; some research presents a case for afford-
able drug production in developing countries [11] [12],
while others argue that it makes little sense economic-
ally, as such initiatives are most often not reliable and
do not reduce prices [13] [11] [14]. On the ‘Buy-Side’, af-
fordability is a key concern. There are a number of mea-
sures developing country governments can utilize to
increase the affordability of imported ARVs. These in-
clude generic competition, negotiation with patent
holders and bulk procurement. On the ‘Make-Side,’ pub-
lic health interests, economic interests and technological
developments (i.e. manufacturing capacity) should be
addressed.
Domestic manufacturing also does not guarantee
greater stability in supply, a key component of access to
medicines. Despite this, there are compelling arguments
that it brings benefits in addition to price reduction. Do-
mestic manufacturing keeps money in the economy, by
employing people and investing in infrastructure and fa-
cilities. Backing this, the African Union [15] argues that
domestic drug production develops the appropriate in-
dustrial and technical infrastructure that can enhance
long-term health security, self-sufficiency, employment,
foreign exchange, in addition to access to essential medi-
cines. In other words, local manufacturing potentially
can bring economic and symbolic gains to a country.
We examine the “make or buy” dilemma and the crit-
ical limitations of domestic manufacturing through the
case study of Tanzania’s attempt to domestically manu-
facture ARVs with an imitation technology transfer
agreement. Tanzania is a least developed country (LDC)
according to United Nations criteria [16], with 35.7% of
the population living below the poverty line and a GNI
of US$500 per capita [17]. There are 1,400,000 people
living with HIV only 32% of which are undergoing treat-
ment [2]. With a commitment to increase ARV availabil-
ity, the government considered domestic production as a
means to scale up treatment to improve the health of its
population. The local manufacturer Tanzania Pharma-
ceutical Industries (TPI) entered an agreement to pro-
duce a triple FDC 17 of first-line ARVs lamivudine,
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TT-Vir.
This paper examines several barriers that TPI faces in
establishing secure local manufacturing of ARVs. The
limited support from policy makers, the conditions of
the technology transfer agreement, its level of manufac-
turing capacity, and its ability to compete in domestic
and regional markets are considered. These factors sug-
gest that the limits to affordability in TPI’s ARV manu-
facturing strategy are not overcome by the economic
interests of the government. There is no strong commit-
ment from the Tanzanian government on the use of
TRIPS flexibilities; instead ministries are pressuring for
increased IP protection. These considerations weaken
the ‘Make’ side of the debate. On the ‘Buy’ side, the case
study suggests that TPI will not be able to match donor
prices (within 10-15% to ensure affordability) [18]. As
well, TPI’s limited manufacturing capacity, its lack of
WHO prequalification status and the difficulty of enter-
ing broader markets hurt TPI’s ability to price its ARVs
competitively. As a result of these barriers, TPI cannot
meet the necessary economies of scale and offer com-
petitive prices.
Methods
Purposive sampling of documents, key informant inter-
views and event driven observation were used to collect
data for this case study. A broad range of documents
were collected, including reports from international
organizations (World Bank, WHO, WTO), government
publications, and local pharmaceutical industry docu-
ments. Document collection began with a search of pub-
licly accessible documents and was supported by
recommendations from key informants.
Selection of key documents analyzed for data collection
 Patent legislation
 Health legislation
 National drug policies
 Science and technology policies
 Industrial policies
 National AIDS plans
 ARV tender documents
 Bilateral/multilateral/international trade agreements
 Submissions to government by interest groups
 Local pharmaceutical industry assessments
 Annual reports of drug firms
 Newspaper articles, industry newswires, and press
releases
A total of 24 semi-structured interviews were con-
ducted in Tanzania (by KRW) over a three -month
period. Representatives from government agencies (9interviews), the pharmaceutical industry (11 interviews),
and international, bilateral organizations and NGOs (4
interviews) were interviewed. A series of open ended
questions were used in all interviews which prompted
new questions based on responses. Interviews pro-
gressed from a broad to more explicit conversation.
Organizations interviewed for data collection
Government representatives and agencies (9 interviews)
 Ministry of Health and Social Welfare
 National AIDS Control Programme
 Tanzania Food and Drug Administration
 Medical Stores Department
 Commission for Science and Technology
 Tanzania Investment Centre
 Business Registration and Licensing Agency






Pharmaceutical industry (11 interviews)
 Tanzania Pharmaceutical Industries





What is the current context in your country with
regard to HIV/AIDS and ARV drug access?
What led to the decision to locally produce patented
ARVs?
Factors influencing technology transfer arrangements
What led to the development of the current TT
arrangement?
What are the most important factors that shaped the
transfer arrangement?
How have national policies in place affected the
development of the transfer arrangements?
How have international policies affected the
development of the transfer arrangements?
How has the manufacturing and technological capacity
of the recipient firm affected the development of the
transfer arrangements?
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those of others in your region?
Process of technology transfer
How much communication is there between supplier
and recipients firms?
What are the terms or conditions of the transfer
arrangement?
What is/was the duration of the transfer arrangement?
What have been the processes involved in the transfer
of technology?
What type of knowledge was/is exchanged during the
transfer (for example, technical, informational,
managerial, training, etc.)?
What are the end goals of the transfer arrangement
What was the greatest obstacle in the transfer
arrangement?
What are the most important elements of effective
technology transfer?
How would you compare this arrangement with other
possible technology transfer arrangements in your
region?
Contextual
How would you define technology?
How would you define technology transfer?
Purposive sampling also assured that those interviewed
and observed had specific knowledge on the events lead-
ing to technology transfer arrangements and local manu-
facturing initiatives. Data collection continued until
evidence collected did not produce new information or
themes [19]. Interviews began with open-ended ques-
tions and progressed to a tighter structure.
Participant observation was used to gather evidence and
to gain an in-depth understanding of the processes sur-
rounding the technology transfer arrangement. One week
was spent at TPI and a High Level Meeting on Intellectual
Property was attended. Observations were guided by the
semi-structured interview questions and were recorded
based on what was observed, who was observed, and
when and where the sample was observed [20].
Open coding was used to identify themes in the docu-
ments, interviews, and observations. Preliminary coding
of interview transcripts was done by two coders (KRW
and JCK). Data was then grouped into thematic categor-
ies and relationships were identified and more closely
analyzed.
Key concepts
The transfer of technology is an unclear term, particu-
larly in terms of its implications under the TRIPSAgreement, as it allows for various interpretations. The
definition of technology transfer for the purposes of this
research integrates the definitions by Maskus [21] and
UNCTAD [22]. It is understood as a process for the
transformation of information between a technology
supplier and a recipient for the manufacture of ARVs.
Technology transfer can range from the exchange of
technical knowledge through formal documentation,
such as a license to exploit a patent, or through tech-
nical know-how and assistance in reverse engineering an
imitation of the product. Significantly, there must be in-
tent to pass on technological information from a sup-
plier to an unrelated recipient firm. For example, in this
research, FDI for subsidiaries in developing countries is
not considered transfer of technology. This is because
the patent holder remains the only right holder of the
information, and the effective monopoly conferred by
the patent status stays intact.
This case study considers an imitator (reverse engineer-
ing) technology transfer arrangement An imitator ar-
rangement occurs when the supplier is not the patent
holder, but a generic firm or any other type of
organization with the knowledge to formulate and. In this
case, the development of manufacturing capacity through
the construction of a new ARV manufacturing facility
facilitates imitation. ARV manufacturing capacity is the
ability of a local firm to develop a number of quality ARVs
and produce them at a competitive international price.
These arrangements rely on individuals and organizations
external to the patent holders that have knowledge on the
production of the patented ARV and commonly include
more extensive technology transfer terms than found in
voluntary licenses.
Within the framework of the make or buy debate we
focus heavily on technological capabilities on the make
side and generic competition on the buy side. The level of
technological capabilities in developing countries has been
described by a number of sources [23] [24] [18] [25-27]).
Three levels of production are usually delineated: primary,
secondary, and tertiary production. Primary production,
most prominently found in India and China, includes the
conversion of raw materials and intermediates to active
pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs). Secondary production
involves the processing and formulation of finished dosage
forms from APIs, and is found in countries such as Brazil
and South Africa (although facilities in both countries
have some API production as well). Tertiary production
packages and labels finish products from primary and sec-
ondary sources. Generally, countries first develop the cap-
acity for tertiary production, which can help build the
requisite skills and experience for higher levels of produc-
tion over time [13].
Generic competition commonly used as a mechanism
for driving down drug prices, having a significant impact
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the make-or-buy debate due to the rapid growth of the
Indian generic industry. As India did not have to enforce
product patents until after the 2005 transition period it
expanded its generic industry with the help of advocates
and international organizations such as the William J.
Clinton Foundation and MSF. By 2007, the Clinton
HIV/AIDS Initiative (CHAI) negotiated to drop the price
of the first-line treatment tenofovir + emtricitabine + efa-
virenz (TDF+ FTC+EFV) from the 2007 price of US
$487 pppy (MSF, 2007) to US$349pppy in 2008 [28] [1].




Tanzania lacks a coherent policy strategy for the devel-
opment of its industry. Moreover, pharmaceutical patent
enforcement is weak and investment in science and
technology is stagnant, a scenario common in many
developing countries. This provides little incentive for
industry to invest in local manufacturing. Tanzania’s
technology transfer agreement was undertaken by a
partly state owned company without WHO prequalifica-
tion of its drugs, another disincentive for private
investors.
The impetus for the technology transfer for the pro-
duction of the first-line treatment 3TC+d4T+NVP
came from Tanzania’s need to drastically scale-up HIV
treatment to match its 2008 goal of treating 423,000
HIV-infected individuals with ARVs [29]. By 2006 only
64,000 individuals had been treated out of 1.4 million
HIV-infected citizens [30]. Enhancing research capacity,
research infrastructure, and technology transfer are key
priorities for Tanzanian policy and are necessary for
growth in the pharmaceutical sector. Even so, there is
little evidence of solid commitment [31].
Shortfalls in support extend to local drug production
and the use of TRIPS flexibilities. We found that only
the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW) ex-
plicitly promotes the local pharmaceutical industry. In
contrast, the Ministry of Trade and Industries and the
Ministry of Science and Technology emphasize increas-
ing IP protection. Although Tanzania’s 1992–2000
Pharmaceutical Master Plan (PMP) committed to the
objective of increasing the procurement of locally manu-
factured drugs from 30% to 60% of market share by
2010 the tender process has been under scrutiny for lack
of transparency and possible corruption [32].
The level of enforcement of patent protection in Tan-
zania is an important determinant of the success of local
drug manufacturing. Tanzania has until 2016 to comply
with TRIPS, but terms Articles 7(1) and 8 of the 1987
Tanzanian Patent Act make both pharmaceutical processand product patents available [33]. Article 38(1) of the
Tanzanian Patent Act states that patents are only
granted for 10 years from filing, as opposed to the
20 years mandated by TRIPS. Yet the information pub-
lished on the website of the Business Registrations and
Licensing Agency states that a 20 year patent term is
given [34]. However, the strength of the enforcement
surrounding the patent law is unclear. Informants
assumed that patents were not enforced by the govern-
ment or industry. This scenario is not atypical in Sub-
Saharan Africa where patent holders have waived their
IP rights for many first-line ARVs, with the exception of
patents held in South Africa [35]. Information on the
current patent policies is also inconsistent.
Two of the five first-line ARVs included in the FDC
treatment manufactured by TPI, 3TC and NVP, were
patented in Tanzania but both expired in 2001 under the
10 year patent term. Consequently, the manufacturing of
this ARV does not contravene the Tanzania Patent Act
or the TRIPS Agreement. Though Tanzania can be seen
as exercising the 2016 transition period, the use of the
TRIPS flexibilities is not part of a legislative framework.
Although the MoHSW is in support of such a change,
other agencies aim to enact change in the other
direction.
Technology transfer arrangement
Though originally state-owned, TPI was partially priva-
tized in 1997. Currently, 40% of its shares are held by
the government and 60% by Tanzanian entrepreneurs.
The WHO does not promote government-led local pro-
duction, encouraging them to focus on regulatory
mechanisms [15]. The perception of the capacity of
state-owned pharmaceutical firms, however, varied
across informants. Some pointed to a lack of transpar-
ency, corruption, poor management, and bureaucracy
that create inefficiencies within the industry. In fact, the
Global Competitiveness Report 2008/2009 named cor-
ruption as one of the most problematic factors for doing
business in Tanzania [36]. This may deter private inves-
tors who believe that a government share in TPI
increases bureaucratic procedures and reduces
transparency.
Still others expressed a positive view of government-
sponsored industry. Within its grant application to the
European Commission, Action Medeor emphasized the
sustainability of the technology transfer initiative given
TPI’s status as an enterprise with government share-
holders that support the project as part of its responsi-
bility and operations. An informant at the European
Commission acknowledged that more government in-
volvement and support may have enhanced TPI’s grant
application as it assured the country’s commitment to
address HIV/AIDS and improve sustainability of supply.
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does not necessarily lead to greater sustainability.
TPI’s manufacturing capacity for bulk pharmaceuticals
prior to the European Commission grant was limited
[18] [25] [27]. TPI does not have API manufacturing
capacity; a 5-year fixed cost agreement with China’s
MChem maintains its supply. It has some secondary
production capacity, making primarily antibiotics,
analgesics, and antimalarials with recent expansion to
artemisinin-based antimalarials following privatization
and another technology transfer agreement.
The arrangement under study began in October 2005
between TPI and a former member of the Research &
Development Institute of the Government Pharmaceut-
ical Organization (GPO) of the Ministry of Health, Thai-
land. In November 2006, a formal partnership was
established with German non-governmental organization
(NGO), Action Medeor, to construct a new ARV manu-
facturing facility financed by a 48-month, US$6 million
grant from the European Commission. Two primary
goals of the grant were to build a facility in line with
WHO prequalification standards and to build technical
capacity to produce ARVs.
The grant had some limitations which led to some
concern amongst informants. It did not cover the cost of
the prequalification process itself or the cost for devel-
oping drugs. Industry informants estimated the cost of a
single oral dose of the ARV to be between US$800,000
and US$1 million. There were also doubts that the US$6
million grant would cover the cost of the new manufac-
turing facility. A similar partnership between the Indian
firm Cipla and Ugandan firm Quality Chemicals had the
Ugandan firm raising $38 million internally to construct
an internationally certified facility [37]. Finally, infor-
mants were not convinced that the grant was sufficient
to produce a facility compliant with WHO Good Manu-
facturing Practices (GMP). Nevertheless, the facility was
completed in late 2011. Additional contributions from
TPI, which had not been confirmed at the time of inter-
views, were made. These consisted of US$963,000. Ac-
tion Medeor also gave US$600,000 more [38].
Competitiveness
The competitiveness of the first-line ARV market means
TPI needs sufficient economies of scale along with
WHO prequalified ARVs to meet the target price range.
Like many Sub-Saharan African and LDC manufac-
turers, TPI only has limited capability to formulate and
package bulk pharmaceuticals, limiting its ability to
compete [39] [25] [27].
Production scale is a significant disadvantage for an
LDC manufacturer when attempting to reach economies
of scale. The facility funded by the European Commis-
sion is designed to manufacture 100 million units peryear. This is in contrast to the existing 500 million
tablets per year capability for Tanzanian firms and 1.2
billion tablets per year for South African and Indian
firms [40]. Local manufacturers also face additional costs
which are not as great a concern for multinational gen-
eric firms. Because they do not have primary production
capacity, the cost of importing APIs must be considered.
These play a much smaller role for integrated generic
manufacturers. Packaging material is another supple-
mentary cost. Though no taxes are paid for API or inter-
mediates imports, they are paid for the packaging
materials. This can result in higher taxes for local firms
than for importers [40]. Import costs (freight costs)
themselves, often considered a strong area of savings for
local firms, only accounts for 4% of the 25% difference
in Tanzanian and Indian generic firm production costs
[40].
Large tenders are also needed to obtain economies of
scale. In this regard, donor financed drugs in Sub-
Saharan Africa present the biggest barrier for local man-
ufacturers in Tanzania. Many donors, including the Glo-
bal Fund for HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and
PEPFAR focus on ARV procurement but require compli-
ance with international quality standards. National ten-
ders financed by the government exist but the large
number of people needing treatment and the availability
of donor financing mean that the government generally
does not fund ARV programs entirely.
TPI has not been granted certification by the WHO
Prequalification Programme or approval by the United
States Food and Drug Administration (participation in
PEPFAR tenders), thereby disqualifying the firm from
competing in donor-financed ARV tenders. WHO Pre-
qualification vouches for the safety and efficacy of a
company’s products. To obtain it a company must first
get an invitation from the WHO to submit a product for
evaluation, submit data on the quality, safety, and effi-
cacy of the product, and have its manufacturing sites
assessed [41]. It can take from 3 to 24 months and cost
a firm up to $200,000. Technology suppliers suggested
that TPI could potentially avoid the barriers of WHO
prequalification and international competitive bidding by
producing off-patent drugs for opportunistic infections
related to HIV/AIDS. But although technology suppliers
have indicated there is a market demand for domestic
production of these drugs no interest has been demon-
strated by the company.
Even in situations where TPI can enter the market (i.e.
government tenders), there is a vast price differential in
the products manufactured by TPI and its cheaper com-
petitors. In January 2007, TPI estimated to manufacture
3TC+d4T+NVP for US$240 pppy while Cipla’s prequa-
lified FDC went down to US$92 pppy with competition
[42]. The MSD allows 15% equalization for domestic
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generic firms is still a concern. Economies of scale are a
key factor in the lower prices of large firms, but local in-
dustry informants also suggested that predatory prices
are used to prevent small firms from entering the
market.
Competition concerns also extend beyond large for-
eign manufacturers; domestic competition is an increas-
ing concern. The School of Pharmacy at the Muhimbili
University College of Health Science is assessing the
possibility of opening a pharmaceutical plant for training
pharmacists and produce medicines. In addition, the
local firm Shelys Pharmaceuticals was acquired by Aspen
Pharmacare, the largest pharmaceutical manufacturer in
Sub-Saharan Africa. In early 2008, Shelys Pharmaceuti-
cals entered into a technology transfer agreement with
Roche to strengthen their capacity in ARV manufactur-
ing [43]. These firms would also receive the 15%
equalization preference given to domestic manufacturers
in tenders. The August 30 Decision allows export of
generics to other countries in regions where over 50%
have LDC status. Although TPI aims to expand into
EAC markets and the South African Development Com-
munity, its inability to compete effectively in the domes-
tic market suggests it will be more challenging for TPI
to participate in the regional markets. Regional exports
from Tanzanian companies generally pay the same im-
port tariffs as exports from Asia with no advantage
gained from Sub-Saharan African trade agreements [40].
Labour costs are likely lower in Tanzania, but when
compared to other countries with generic manufacturing
initiatives (such as India, China, Kenya and South Af-
rica), they relate poorly to worker productivity [36]. Fur-
thermore, because of the prominence of donor-financed
tenders throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, the lack of
WHO Prequalification would continue to be a
limitation.
Discussion
The “make-or-buy” debate, in the context of ARVs in
Tanzania, exemplifies the challenges local pharmaceut-
ical manufacturers face in least developing countries in
an effort to ensure better access of the population to es-
sential medicines. The barriers to local firms are great
and we found that there is consequently a lack of strong
incentives for international firms to transfer technology
for the purpose of domestic ARV production in Tanza-
nia. Several key concerns emerged in the analysis:
 Lack of political support: there is no consensus
amongst different ministry agencies on the
appropriate level of IP protection. Although the
technology transfer agreement examined here can
be interpreted as a use of the TRIPS flexibility forLDC countries, it was not put in place due to any
legislative framework in Tanzania.
 Limited production capacity: although informants
suggested that TPI would be more successful if it
entered the market for other classes of drugs such
as those for opportunistic infections related to HIV/
AIDS, this is not the direction which the company
chose to take. Yet its capacity for generating
economies of scale for ARVs through savings in
production is limited making it difficult to price
products competitively.
 Limited competitiveness in multiple markets: TPI is
greatly limited by its lack of WHO prequalification
which excludes it from donor financed tenders. It
must also face emerging domestic competition and
significant cost barriers in entering regional markets.
By assessing the domestic conditions affecting the devel-
opment and affordability of locally manufactured ARVs
in Tanzania, the case study results are useful to develop-
ing country governments faced with securing low-cost
essential medicines for their populations as well as
building their countries’ technological capacity. Within
the “make-or-buy” context, this paper highlights the dif-
ficulty of domestic manufacturers to supply affordable
medicines when a large number of high volume inter-
national competitors exist. It suggests that LDCs, with
little financing, have limited opportunities to attract the
transfer of technology, regardless of their IP status.
Lessons learned from the study include:
 Cohen-Kohler’s [44] suggestion that even though
TRIPS provisions offer governments the ability to
put health before trade objectives, many developing
countries and LDCs simply cannot utilize these
provisions is reinforced.
 Barriers in administration, politics, policy, and
capacity limit the use of TRIPS flexibilities in LDCs.
 Successful technology transfer arrangements and
manufacturing initiatives require long-term
coordination and planning across health, industrial,
and science and technology sectors.
 Efforts to develop industry will have great difficulty
in succeeding if driven entirely by the health sector
 The need to address adequate economies of
scale of [QA= quality assured?] production must
be established from the start in the initial business
plan
These factors should be addressed upfront by developing
country governments and firms, along with other noted
barriers, to evaluate whether or not the initiative is viable.
Detailed cross-sector planning is imperative for develop-
ing countries to provide sustainable drug supplies for their
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outcomes.
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